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in their favor. 82 Without a sufficient showing by the city that the
ordinance was necessary to achieve a reduction in the spread of
sexually transmitted diseases, the court reversed the order below
83
and granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction.
The creators of the Federal Constitution envisioned that the
citizens of this country would be guaranteed certain minimum
liberty protections under the Federal Constitution which the states
would be free to expand upon via their individual state
constitutions. New York exercised this option and has,
historically, chosen to extend greater protection in the area of
free speech and expression than the federal government. While
the Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to
require only that incidental burdens to free expression be
"narrowly tailored,"' 84 the New York State Court of Appeals has
interpreted Article 1, section 8 of the New York State
Constitution as requiring that "the least restrictive means"
possible be employed to burden its citizens.85 Thus, the disparity
of results reached by a challenge brought under the Federal and
State Constitutions can be understood not only as a contrast in the
liberty interest provided by each, but also as a difference in the
measuring standard utilized by the court.

SUPREME COURT
NEW YORK COUNTY
Stringfellow's of New York Ltd. v. City of New York 86
(decided October 24, 1996)
Plaintiff Stringfellow's, along with plaintiffs in two similar
actions, sought to declare as invalid a zoning resolution which, if
82. Id.
83. Id. at 279, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
84. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382.
85. See Matter of Nicholson, 50 N.Y.2d 597, 409 N.E.2d 818, 431
N.Y.S.2d 340 (1980).
86. 653 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1996).
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enacted, would restrict the operation of adult entertainment
establishments to certain areas within New York City. 87
Plaintiffs argued that enactment of such a zoning resolution
violated their freedom of expression rights guaranteed under
Article I Section 8 of the New York State Constitution. 88 The
court, in denying plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and
granting defendant City of New York's motion for summary
judgment determined that the resolution "d[id] not violate
plaintiffs' rights of freedom of expression guaranteed under the

State constitution, and [wa]s therefore, constitutional."

89

In

reaching this determination, the court found that the zoning
resolution in question would not silence freedom of expression
nor would it interfere with "New York's long history and
tradition of fostering freedom of expression and tolerating ideas
that some may find offensive." 90
At issue in these cases is the zoning resolution known as the
"Text Amendment N 950384 ZRY" (hereinafter referred to as
"Amended Zoning Resolution") which was drafted with an eye
towards restricting adult use establishments in areas such as
residential neighborhoods, and the facilities and commercial areas
that serve them, as well as certain districts of New York City
which are zoned for commercial and manufacturing uses but
87. Id. at 803. This action also concerns two other actions which seek the
same relief. Id. Those actions, Hickerson v. City of New York and
Amsterdam Video, Inc. v. City of New York, are so intertwined with the facts
and law of the case at bar that all three cases were joined together, in so far as
deciding the motions for summary judgment premised on the right to freedom
of expression under the New York State Constitution. Id. In Hickerson,
plaintiffs, Manhattan and Bronx residents, sued the City of New York claiming
that the zoning resolution infringed on their freedom of expression rights as
regular patrons of these adult entertainment establishments. Id. In Amsterdam
Video, 92 adult entertainment establishments challenged the validity of the
zoning resolution in question. Id.
88. N.Y. CONST. art I. §8. This section provides in pertinent part:
"Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
89. Stringfellow's, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
90. Id.
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permit new residential development. 91 The Amended Zoning
Resolution was proposed in response to a study which was
undertaken by the City of New York, specifically, the
Department of City Planning ("DCP"), as a result of community
concerns which were voiced relating to the effects and impact
adult entertainment establishments had on the community.92 As
of 1993, there were 177 such establishments, a thirty-five percent
increase since 1984. 93 Once the study was concluded, the DCP
determined that with the increase in the number of adult uses
citywide, many adult entertainment establishments had located to
"tend[ed] to produce negative
residential areas 94 which
secondary effects such as increased crime, decreased property
' 95
values, and reduced shopping and commercial activities."
Based on these conclusions the DCP recommended "that the
zoning resolution be amended so as to oregulate adult
entertainment establishments more closely than other commercial
uses by placing restrictions on the proximity of adult uses to
residential areas, schools, houses of worship, and other adult
96
establishments.,,
91. Id. at 804 (explaining Amended Zoning Resolution §§32-01(a) and 4201(a)).
92. Id. at 803. These studies included one by the New York City
Department of City Planning ("DCP") undertaken in 1993 to determine
whether the zoning ordinance in effect at that time should be amended to
regulate these adult use establishments. Id. During the course of this study,

seven areas were targeted for review. These areas included certain districts
within each of the five boroughs: Manhattan, Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens and
Staten Island. Id. However, the DCP did not include the Times Square area
within its study since that area was already being studied by Times Square
Business Improvement District ("TSBID"). Id.
93. Id. at 803.
94. Id. at 804. As the court illustrated, many adult entertainment
establishments have "clustered in central locations such as Times Square" in
Manhattan. Id. Similarly, "[i]n the outer boroughs, these establishments have
concentrated along major arteries, such as Queens Boulevard in Queens and
Third Avenue in Brooklyn." Id.
95. Id.

96. Id. The court noted that "[p]rior to this recommendation, the City's
zoning resolution had made no distinction between adult entertainment
establishments and other commercial activities." Id.
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This Amended Zoning Resolution which was approved on
October 25, 1995 had as its objective the dilution of "adult
entertainment establishments in certain neighborhoods by
dispersing such businesses to certain permissible zoned districts.
. . [in order] to shield the City's residential neighborhoods, and
the facilities and commercial areas that served them, from the
negative impacts produced by adult uses." 97 The Amended
Zoning Resolution contained several provisions -which included
prohibition of adult entertainment establishments in certain
districts, 9 8 restrictions on placement of adult uses in other

districts, 9 9 and prevention of the concentration of adult uses in
other districts. 10 0 Moreover, the Resolution provided for an
amortization period for those existing adult use establishments to

come into conformity with the Resolution with
exemptions.

101

limited

97. Id. at 804.
98. Id. The court noted that the prohibition on adult uses was targeted for
residentially zoned districts and certain commercial and manufacturing districts
which permit new residential development. Id. (explaining Amended Zoning
Resolution §§32-01(a) and 42-01(a)).
99. Id. at 805. The court explained what these restrictions entailed and the
purpose behind their enactment. Id. The objective behind imposing these
restrictions was to "further ensure that such [adult] uses do not adversely
impact residential communities or the facilities that serve them." Id. In
restricted districts, adult use establishments "must be located at least 500 feet
from any school, day care center, or house of worship and at least 500 feet
from most zoning districts in which new residential uses are allowed." Id.
(citing Amended Zoning Resolution §§32-01(a) and 42-01(b)).
100. Id. at 805. In order to prevent the concentration of adult use
establishments, in those districts where adult uses are permissible, such a new
adult use establishment "must be located at least 500 feet from any other adult
use." (discussing Amended Zoning Resolution §§32-01(c) and 42-01(c)). Id.
Furthermore, "only one adult establishment, not to exceed 10,000 square feet
of usable floor area, may be located on a zoning lot. Id. (citing §§32-01(d)
and 42-01(d)). Moreover, the resolution "also regulates the size, placement
and illumination of accessory business signs on adult establishments, but not
their content." Id. (citing Amended Zoning Resolution §§32-69 and 42-55).
101. Id. at 805. The amortization period is one year for an existing adult
use establishment to conform or terminate. Id. However, a non-conforming
adult use establishment may apply for an extension to allow operation for more
than one year provided the applicant meets certain criteria. Id. (explaining
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Ruling in favor of defendants' motion for summary judgment
in supporting the enactment of the Amended Zoning Resolution
and consequently, against plaintiffs, the court in Stringfellow's
based its decision solely on an analysis under the New York State

Constitution. In reaching its conclusion, the court applied state
law, relying on New York and federal court decisions which
dealt with ordinances or regulations infringing upon freedom of
speech or expression in the commercial arena. 102 In relying
predominately on New York case law, the Stringfellow's court

recognized that "New York's constitutional guarantee affords
greater protection than its federal counterpart" 10 3 and also
affirmed New York's "long history and tradition in fostering
freedom of expression, often tolerating and supporting works

which in other States would be found offensive to the
104

community."
Beginning its discussion on the constitutionality of the
Amended Zoning Resolution, the court in Stringfellow's
examined the competing principles between Article I, Section 8,
Amended Zoning Resolution §72-40). Existing adult use establishments in
permissible districts which otherwise conform to the provisions of the
Resolution but "are within 500 feet of another adult use, located on the same
zoning lot of another adult use, or exceed 10,000 square feet of usable floor
area, would not be subject to the amortization provisions . . . . " Id.
(discussing Amended Zoning Resolution §§32-01(f), 42-01(f) and 52-77).
102. Stringfellow's, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 806. See, e.g., Town of Islip v.
Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 540 N.E.2d 215, 542 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1989); People
ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492, 510
N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 40
(1986);Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
103. String ellow's, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 805. (referring to U.S. CONST.
amend. I. which provides in relevant part that "Congress shall make no law.
• .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press"). See also Arcara, 68
N.Y.2d 553, 557-58, 503 N.E.2d 492, 494-95, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846-47
(finding that "the minimal national standard established by the Supreme Court
for First Amendment rights cannot be considered dispositive in determining the
scope of this State's constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression").
104. Stringfellow's, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 805. See also Arcara, 68 N.Y.2d
553, 557, 503 N.E.2d 492, 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (finding that
"[fireedom of expression in books, movies and the arts, generally, is one of
those areas in which there is great diversity among the States").
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of the New York State Constitution and a municipality's "broad
powers to implement land use controls to meet the increasing
encroachments of urbanization on the quality of life."105 The
court explained the reasons behind restrictions or encroachments
on land use, specifically, "to advance the public health, safety
and welfare." 10 6 Furthermore, "[p]reventing neighborhood

deterioration [wa]s undeniably a legitimate public objective." 107
Moreover, the court examined and discussed the importance

behind zoning and the "preserv[ation ofl the character of specific

areas of a city" which is "the most essential function performed
by local government, for it is one of the primary means by which
we protect that sometimes difficult to define concept of quality of
life." 10 8 To meet this objective, the legislature through the

enactment of zoning ordinances, "enjoy[s] a strong presumption
of constitutionality and if there is a reasonable relation between
the end sought to be achieved and the means adopted to achieve
that end the regulation will be upheld." 109 However, there is a

conflict where "a municipality's zoning power is used to regulate
lawfully operating establishments that are devoted to adult uses
105. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 550, 540 N.E.2d at 217, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 141.
See generally, Asian Americans for Equality v. Koch, 72 N.Y.2d 121, 527
N.E.2d 265, 531 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1988); Harbison v. City of Buffalo. 4 N.Y.2d
553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958).
106. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 550, 540 N.E.2d at 217, 542 N.Y.S.2d at
141(citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Udell v. Haas, 21
N.Y.2d 463, 469-70, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 894 (1968)).
107. Stringfellow's, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 806 (citation omitted). The court
went on to explain that "[w]ithout stable residential and commercial
neighborhoods large sections of a modem city can quickly deteriorate into an
urban jungle with tragic consequences to social, environmental and economic
values." Id. (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 80
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring)).
108. Stringfellow's, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 806. (citing Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 80 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)).
109. Stringfellow's, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 806. The court noted that "[w]here the
issue is 'fairly debatable' courts must defer to the legislative judgment on the
need for such regulation. See, e.g., Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 540 N.E.2d
215, 542 N.Y.S.2d 139; McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544,
488 N.E.2d 1240, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985); Shepard v. Village of
Skaneateles, 300 N.Y. 115, 89 N.E.2d 619 (1949).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/27

6

846

et al.: Freedom of Speech

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 13

protected under this State's constitutional guarantee of freedom of

expression. "110
It is with this background and understanding of the
municipality's legislative power concerning the welfare of its
community that the court in Stringfellow's discussed the
appropriate test to analyze the constitutional right to freedom of
speech and expression under the New York State Constitution in
relation to the Amended Zoning Resolution at issue. 111
112
The Supreme Court in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters
enunciated the applicable test for reasonable content-neutral time,

110. Stringfellow's, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 806 (citation omitted).
111. Id.
112. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). The respondents operated two movie theaters in
the City of Renton which showed adult films, thus categorizing the theater as
an "adult motion picture theater" as that term is defined in the City's zoning
ordinance: "[an enclosed building used for presenting motion picture films,
video cassettes, cable television, or any other such visual media, distinguished
or characteri[zed] by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to
'specified sexual activities' or 'specified anatomical areas'. . . for observation
by patrons therein." Id. at 44-45 (citations omitted). The ordinance in
question prohibited these 'adult motion picture theaters' from locating within
1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church,
park or school. Id. at 44. The respondents challenged the ordinance on First
and Fourteenth amendment grounds. Id. at 45. However, the Supreme Court
upheld the ordinance as a reasonable content-neutral time, place, and manner
restriction which was designed to serve a substantial governmental interest
without unreasonably limiting alternative avenues of communication. Id. at
54-55. The Court summarily held that:
[T]he Renton ordinance represents a valid governmental
response to the 'admittedly serious problems' created by
adult theaters. Renton has not used 'the power to zone as a
pretext for suppressing expression', but rather has sought to
make some areas available for adult theaters and their
patrons, while at the same time preserving the quality of life
in the community at large by preventing those theaters from
locating in other areas. This, after all, is the essence of
zoning. Here . . . the city has enacted a zoning ordinance
that meets these goals while also satisfying the dictates of the
First Amendment.
Id. at 54-55 (citations omitted).
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place, and manner restrictions on commercial speech, 113 which has
been followed and applied to constitutional claims under the New
York State Constitution as in Town of Islip v. Caviglia.1 14 In order
to be a reasonable content-neutral time, place and manner
restriction, the court inStringfellow's relied on certain elements
established pursuant to the Renton test and applied to Caiglia.
The appropriate test for reasonable content-neutral time, place
and manner restrictions on commercial speech is similar under an

113. Regulations which are deemed reasonable content-neutral time, place,
and manner restrictions on commercial speech are justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech, relating only to the time, place, and
manner of expression, and "are valid if the governmental interest to be
achieved outweighs the resulting interference with free expression." Caviglia,
73 N.Y.2d at 556-57, 540 N.E.2d at 221, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 145; See generally
Renton, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
114. 73 N.Y.2d 544, 540 N.E.2d 215, 542 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1989). The
petitioner, Town of Islip, enacted a zoning ordinance which differentiated
between certain "adult uses" and limited the operation of these adult uses to
areas zoned Industrial I. 73 N.Y.2d at 548, 540 N.E.2d at 216, 542 N.Y.S.2d
at 140. Respondent, Caviglia owned and operated the Happy Hour Bookstore
in the heart of the downtown district of the village of Bay Shore, outside the
Industrial I zone. Id. at 550, 540 N.E.2d at 217, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 141. This
bookstore excluded minors by reason of age and therefore fell within the
definition of "adult use" under the ordinance. Id. The respondents challenged
the ordinance on First Amendment grounds as violating their constitutional
right to freedom of expression. Id. In upholding the constitutional validity of
the zoning ordinance, the court recognized that "[blecause zoning ordinances
are legislative acts, they enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality and if
there is a reasonable relation between the end sought to be achieved and the
means adopted to achieve it, the regulation will be upheld." 73 N.Y.2d at
550-51, 540 N.E.2d at 217, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 141. Furthermore, utilizing the
rule as formulated in City ofRenton v. Playtime Theaters, the court of appeals
found that petitioner's ordinance met "the federal constitutional requirements
under the Renton test." 73 N.Y.2d at 552, 540 N.E.2d at 218, 542 N.Y.S.2d
at 142. Specifically, the court held that the ordinance w'as "an appropriate
method of addressing existing problems; it [wa]s not overinclusive and it d[id]
not unduly restrict adult uses to limited or unsuitable areas of the town." 73
N.Y.2d at 560, 540 N.E.2d at 223, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 147-148. Moreover, the
ordinance was "no broader than needed for the intended purpose and d[id] not
violate the State Constitution ...

"

73 N.Y.2d at 560, 540 N.E.2d at 224,

542 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
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116
analysis of both New York 115 and Federal Constitutions.
Under this standard, there are four elements which must be
established in order for such regulations on commercial speech to
be valid and constitutional. 117 First, the "predominant purpose" of
the ordinance must not seek to regulate the content of the speech or
expression but to regulate the "secondary effects" of such uses on

the surrounding community. 1 18 Second, the ordinance must be
designed in such a way as to serve a "substantial governmental
interest." 119 Third, the ordinance must be "narrowly tailored" to
affect only those uses that produce the unwanted secondary

115. In Islip, the court noted that "state courts are bound by Supreme Court
decisions defining federal constitutional rights but those rulings establish a
minimum standard which state courts may surpass so long as their holdings do
not conflict with federal law." 73 N.Y.2d at 556, 540 N.E.2d at 221, 542
N.Y.S.2d at 145. Furthermore, the court held that "New York may interpret
its own constitution to extend greater protections to its residents." Id.
Moreover, the court recognized that "New York has a long history and
tradition of fostering freedom of expression, often tolerating and supporting
works which in other states would be found offensive to the community. Id.
(citations omitted).
116. Renton, 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Cf., Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 544, 540
N.E.2d at 215, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 139 (applying the Renton test to alleged
violations of both Federal and New York State constitutional claims of freedom
speech and expression).
117. See Renton, 475 U.S. 41.
118. See, e.g., Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (finding the "predominant purpose"
behind the enactment of a zoning ordinance regulating the locale of certain
adult movie theaters to be the avoidance of unwanted secondary effects by
preventing "crime, protect[ing] the city's retail trade, maintain[ing] property
values, and generally protect[ing] and preserv[ing] the quality of [the city's]
neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life"); Caviglia,
73 N.Y.2d at 552, 540 N.E.2d at 218, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 142 (finding the
"predominant purpose" behind an "adult use" zoning ordinance to be the
"eliminat[ion] of secondary effects of adult uses and [the] attempt[ed] control
[of] future development in the business districts").
119. See, e.g., Renton, 475 U.S. at 50 (recognizing the city's "interest in
attempting to preserve the quality of life, one that must be accorded high
respect") (citations omitted); Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 553, 540 N.E.2d at 219,
542 N.Y.S.2d at 143 (finding that the Town had a substantial "governmental
interest" in the "eradication of the effects of urban blight and neighborhood
deterioration and furtherance of the quality of life for the Town's residents").
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effects. 120 Finally, the ordinance must allow for "reasonable
12 1
alternative avenues of communication or expression."
In applying the Renton test, as well as the New York Court of
Appeal's reasoning in Caviglia, to the case at bar, the
Stringfellow's court found that the Amended Zoning Resolution
passed constitutional muster under the Renton test. 12 2 The court
did not specifically discuss the second element of the Renton test

regarding a "substantial governmental interest," however, such an
interest could be inferred from the totality of the court's analysis
concerning the City's predominate purpose behind the Amended
123
Zoning Resolution's enactment.
First, the court determined that the "predominate purpose"
behind the enactment of the Resolution was to eradicate adverse
secondary effects caused by the proliferation of adult
establishments. 124 These adverse secondary effects were shown
through "planning studies" and reliance on the experiences of other
cities. 12 5 The court found that defendant City of New York's
120. See, e.g., Renton, 475 U.S. at 52 (finding the adult use zoning
ordinance 'narrowly tailored' to affect only that category of theaters shown to
produce the unwanted secondary effects").
121. See, e.g., Renton, 475 U.S. at 53 (holding that the zoning ordinance
provides reasonable alternative locations by leaving "more than five percent of
the entire land area of Renton, open to use as adult theater sites ....
[consisting] of ample, accessible real estate, including 'acreage in all stages of
development from rav land to developed, industrial, warehouse, office and
shopping space that is criss-crossed by freeways, highways and roads'")
(citations omitted); Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 554-55, 540 N.E.2d at 220, 542
N.Y.S.2d at 144 (finding that the adult use Industrial I zoning ordinance
provides over 6,000 acres of land in Industrial I for alternative locations which
includes "85.6 miles of running frontage on open roads which are situated on
lots over 500 feet from a church, park, playground or residential zone").
122. Stringfellow's, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
123. Id. at 807.
124. Id. at 809.
125. 653 N.Y.S.2d at 808. The court recognized that the rationale behind
the use of planning studies to legitimize the City's argument of secondary
effects:
planning studies, by their nature, are not scientific nor their
predictions certain but [a municipality] [is] entitled to credit
the evidence in its study of past deterioratiod and the
prediction that, unless remedied the deterioration would
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"methodology in determining whether adult establishments
-existing in the City produced negative impacts was constitutionally
permissible."' 126 Moreover, the court in Stringfellow's found
plaintiffs' contentions that the City should have conducted its own
independent assessments unpersuasive to invalidate the Amended
Zoning Resolution. 127 The court determined that to establish
adverse secondary effects the City need only show "that there
[wa]s a reasonable belief that adult entertainment businesses,
including the upscale kind allegedly offered by Stringfellow's,
produce at least some of the unwanted secondary effects so as to
permit the City to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious
problems." 128 Thus, the court held that the City of New York
129
satisfied the first element of the Renton test.
After establishing that the predominant purpose behind the City's
enactment of the Amended Zoning Resolution was to eradicate the
adverse secondary effects associated with adult use establishments,
the court reviewed the third element of the Renton test, to
determine whether the Resolution was no broader than necessary to
continue; it [is] not required to wait before acting until its
business area [become] wastelands.
Id. (quoting Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 553-54, 540 N.E.2d at 219, 542 N.Y.S.2d

at 143). Moreover the court in relying on Islip, further explained that
"planning studies have established that adult bookstores and other adult
entertainment facilities are generally injurious to the maintenance and
development of healthy commercial and residential areas." Stringfellow's, 653
N.Y.S.2d at 808. (citing Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 555, 540 N.E.2d at 218, 542
N.Y.S.2d at 142).
126. Stringfellow's, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
127. Id.

128. Id. See also ILQ Investments, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d
1413, 1416-17 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the City permissibly relied on

studies conducted in other cities to determine whether adult use establishments
had an adverse secondary effect on the community).

129. Stringfellow's, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 809. The court summarily held that
[t]he voluminous and comprehensive administrative record
clearly demonstrates the City not only reviewed studies from
other jurisdictions, but actually used those studies to guide it
in its study to determine the existence of negative secondary

effects associated with adult use businesses, and in
formulating a proper response to combat such effects.
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meet the City's underlying purpose in enacting the Resolution. 13 0
The court quickly dismissed plaintiff's contention that the
Resolution was not narrowly drawn by recognizing the City's
ability to "utilize its zoning powers to address thenegative effects
associated with adult use businesses given the fact that such effects
are not subject to direct attack." 13 1 Thus, the court found that
"[u]nder these circumstances, the Amended Zoning Resolution
[wa]s no broader than necessary, and d[id] not violate the State
132
Constitution."
Finally, the court addressed the fourth element of the Renton test
which required that the Amended Zoning Resolution provide for
"reasonable alternative avenues of communication ' 133 or ensure
that "there remain[ed] ample space available for adult uses." 134 In
addressing this inquiry, the court in Stringfellow's found that the
City had devoted four percent of its total land, which included
commercial and manufacturing districts in all five boroughs, to
adult use establishments. 13 5 Moreover, the court determined that
adult use establishments were also permitted in districts which
were zoned for "retail, recreational, entertainment and commercial
uses." 136 The City also argued that the available sites within these
districts for adult use establishments are located near mass
transportation, such as buses and subways. 137 The court found
ample evidence in the record to support the City's argument that
ample space is available for adult use establishments thus.
satisfying the fourth element of the Renton test despite plaintiffs'
argument to the contrary. 138 In fact, the court emphatically
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Renton, 475 U.S. at 50.

134. Stringfellow's, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 810 ( quoting Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at
555, 540 N.E.2d at 221, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 145). Although recognizing the
Renton test of "reasonable alternative avenues of communication," the court in
Caviglia interpreted this inquiry to be geographical one when dealing with
adult use establishments and zoning restrictions. Id.
135. Stringfellow's, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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rejected plaintiffs' contention that the alternative sites were remote
or inaccessible. 139 Rather the court found that despite "the
plethora of generalized and conclusory allegations made by
plaintiffs, the record [wa]s utterly devoid of a single action taken
by a single affected owner or operator of an adult establishment to
140
negotiate for alternative space."
Moreover, the court found that plaintiffs' reliance on Topanga
Press lnc. v. City of Los Angeles1 41 only reiterated and supported
the City's argument that the Amended Zoning Resolution provided
for ample space. 142 In Topanga, the Ninth Circuit grappled with
the question of whether a zoning ordinance which restricted the
placement of new and existing adult use establishments within five
hundred feet of a residential area was constitutional. 143 The
Topanga court found that such an ordinance was impermissible
where it did not provide for reasonable alternative avenues of
expression because the sufficiency of the land allotted for the
relocation of adult use establishments to coilform with the
ordinance was wholly lacking. 144 In fact, the ratio of available
sites to relocating businesses in Topanga was only one to one
whereas the ratio in Stringfellow's was greater than three to one. 145
Therefore, in light of the fact that defendant City of New York had
"more than sufficiently demonstrated that the permissible areas
[were] suitable for commercial enterprise and [were] large enough
to accommodate adult establishments which must relocate," the
court validated the Amended Zoning Resolution and found that the
14 6
City satisfied this fourth, and final element of the Renton test.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 813.
141. 989 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993).
142. Stringfellow's, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 813. The court found that the "key
was whether the challenged Amended Zoning Resolution allow[ed] for the
operation of at least as many adult establishments as existed before the
enactment." Id.
143. Topanga, 989 F.2d at 1527. Moreover, the ordinance in question in
Topanga required one thousand feet distance between any two adult use
establishments. Id.
144. Id. at 1531-33.
145. Stringfellow's, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
146. Id. at 814.
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Thus, the court upheld the constitutionality of the Amended
Zoning Resolution under the New York State Constitution by
recognizing that the Resolution "carefully balanc[ed] the interests
of those who s[ought] to eliminate the neighborhood blight caused
by an over concentration of adult establishments against an
adult
to
patronize
right
constitutional
individual's
7
14
that
"New
guaranteed
In doing so, the court
establishments."
York's long history and tradition of fostering freedom of
expression and tolerating ideas some may find offensive" would
148
not be disturbed.

147. Id.The court recognized the merit to some of the factors which
plaintiffs" asserted in their favor, however, it held that such factors did not
"render the Amended Zoning Resolution constitutionally infirm." The court
outlined these factors:
[i]t is true, however, as plaintiffs contend that instant
availability to pornography on demand vaill be eliminated
from some sections of the City. It is also true that those who
seek to patronize adult establishments may be minimally
inconvenienced by the need to travel a bit to satisfy their
desires and that the owners and operators of certain adult
establishments may sustain some economic hardship as a
result of the Amended Zoning Resolution.
Id.
148. Id. The court explained that "[tihose seeldng to patronize adult
establishments will be able to continue to beat a path to their doors." Id.
Moreover, "[w]hile x-rated businesses may no longer be located on every
street comer and may no longer dominate the Times Square Area, as long as
the current demand for them exists their numbers will certainly not lessen."
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